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Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and
State Sovereignty in Perspective
Sharon Elizabeth Rush*
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the
laws of the United States.'
Commonly known as the domestic relations exception, the
United States Supreme Court's broad disclaimer of federal power
over family law matters symbolizes the inherent division of power
fundamental to a dual sovereignty. Although the Court announced
the disclaimer only in dicta, and no authoritative analysis of its validity exists, federal courts have adamantly declared that the domestic
relations exception divests them ofjurisdiction over divorce, alimony,
and child custody. Within the last twenty years, however, a growing
number of federal courts have questioned the validity and contours
of the domestic relations exception. This questioning indicates a basic misunderstanding of the role of federal courts in domestic relations law.
A reexamination of the domestic relations exception will help to
clarify this recent confusion. This investigation necessarily considers
the allocation of power between the federal and state governments.
Such questions are especially timely in light of the Burger Court's
2
concern with federalism and state sovereignty.
After examining the historical development and gradual expansion of the domestic relations exception, this article then explores its
validity. Three theories support the exception by suggesting that
federal courts historically lacked power to grant divorces, award alimony, and determine child custody because: (1) diversity jurisdic*
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tion originally did not extend to these suits; (2) the jurisdiction of
article III courts was never intended to extend to these matters; and
(3) such issues are reserved to the states through the tenth
amendment.
This article posits that, outside of granting divorces, awarding
alimony, and determining child custody, federal jurisdiction is not a
question of power, but of abstention. A brief look at sanctioned abstention doctrines demonstrates that some domestic relations cases
warrant judicial restraint. Moreover, abstention is appropriate in
other limited circumstances outside of these sanctioned abstention
doctrines because of the principles of comity and federalism. This
article concludes with a suggested framework for analyzing the domestic relations exception. The framework is designed to avoid confusion in the courts, to increase consistency in the application of the
exception, and to reach results consistent with the development of
the domestic relations exception and principles of comity and
federalism.
I.

The Domestic Relations Exception: Historical Development
and Gradual Expansion
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts recognized and
expanded the scope of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. In divorce, alimony, and child custody cases, the courts
solidified the principle of the domestic relations exception, thereby
effectively removing those cases from the federal courts.
A.

Divorce and Alimony

In 1859, the Supreme Court first proclaimed the principle that
federal jurisdiction does not extend to divorce and alimony suits in
the dicta of Barber v. Barber.3 Mrs. Barber, represented by her next
friend, 4 a New York citizen, brought suit in federal district court in
Wisconsin requesting enforcement of a New York state court decree
awarding her a divorce from bed and board 5 and alimony. Mr. Bar3 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
4 Under English common law, a wife could not maintain a suit in her own name. If she
wished to sue her husband for divorce, or to enforce an alimony award, she could do so only
by way of representation. In England, a married woman (feme covert) could sue in her own
right, as a single woman (feme sole), only if her husband was in exile or had "abjured the
realm." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443.
5 A divorce from bed and board, or a mensa el ihoro, was granted in England by the
ecclesiastical courts. It was only a partial divorce and did not terminate the marriage. In
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ber, a Wisconsin citizen, fraudulently attempted to defeat the New
York decree. Mrs. Barber succeeded and, on appeal, Mr. Barber
challenged the jurisdiction of the district court to hear the case.
At that time, the district court had the power to entertain a case,
if the dispute exceeded $5006 and the suit was "of a civil nature at
common law or in equity

. . .

between a citizen of the State where

the suit was brought, and a citizen of another State.?' 7 In Barber,the
Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction, finding that the parties
were diverse citizens and that the subject matter was proper for a
federal court of equity.8
To reach that decision, the Barber Court first "disclaim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony. .

.

."9 Turning

to the diversity issue, it then found that Mrs. Barber could establish a
domicile separate from that of her husband because of her legal separation.' 0 Thus, diversity of citizenship existed between the parties.
Relying on English history, the Barber Court then found that
Mrs. Barber's suit was an appropriate subject for the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Although only English ecclesiastical courts
could grant divorces and award alimony, English chancery courts
were empowered to enforce the ecclesiastical decrees. By analogy, a
federal district court could enforce a valid state alimony decree."
The Barberopinion, however, implied that state tribunals should
decide ecclesiastical matters, such as divorce and alimony. This implication provides the basic rationale for the domestic relations exAmerica, the divorce from bed and board was considered a legal separation, terminable at the
will of the parties. J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
§ 222, at 343 (5th ed. 1895). A divorce from the bonds of matrimony, or a Vinculo matrmonii,
was a total divorce granted in England only by act of Parliament. It presupposed that the

marriage was void ab initio. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440-41.
6 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
7 Id. The statute admitting Wisconsin to the Union also established a federal district
court and gave it the same jurisdiction and powers which were given to the district court of

Kentucky by the 1789 Act. Act of Aug. 6, 1846, ch 89, § 4, 9 Stat. 56, 57. The 1789 Act gave
the Kentucky district court the same powers as those held by circuit courts, which were
granted jurisdiction over "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" between citizens

of different states. Judiciary Act of 1789, s'upra, §§ 10-11.
8 62 U.S. at 599.
9 Id. at 584.
10 Id. at 597-98. As a general rule, a wife's domicile followed that of her husband. The
Barker Court, however, stated the exception that "if the husband, as is the fact in this case,

abandons their domicil and his wife,. . . and relinquishes altogether his marital control and
protection, he yields up that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil hers
." Id. at 595.
11 Id. at 590-91.
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ception to federal jurisdiction. The question of diverse citizenship
between spouses became a secondary issue which was never completely confronted in Barber. Later courts denied federal diversity jurisdiction over divorce actions on the ground that divorce could not
be reduced to a pecuniary value, so such actions failed to satisfy the
2
statutory amounts required for jurisdiction.'
The Barber dicta that divorce and alimony suits are beyond federal jurisdiction guided federal courts until the Supreme Court ex3
pressly addressed the issue forty years later in Simms v. Simms.1

Unlike Barber, the Simms case originated in a federal territorial court.
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether it had
appellate jurisdiction to review a divorce and alimony decree granted
by Arizona's territorial court. Fundamental to the question of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was an inquiry into the original jurisdiction of the territorial court.1 4 The Sinms Court held that
the territorial courts were not limited by article III of the Constitution since they were legislative courts established under article I of
the Constitution.1 5 Therefore, the Barber dicta did not apply to restrict the jurisdiction of either the territorial courts or the Supreme
6
Court when reviewing them.'
The Simms decision is significant because it perpetuated the validity of the Barber dicta. The decision also included the Supreme
Court's clear position that a domestic relations exception to article
12 In Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899), the Court held that a divorce decree could
not be reviewed on appeal "because that was a matter the value of which could not be estimated in money." It thus failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Id. at 16869. Federal jurisdiction over child custody has been denied on the same basis. See notes 46-52
infra and accompanying text.
13 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
14 Congress had provided that "[t]he legislative power of every Territory shall extend to
all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Id. at 168 (citing the Act of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, 24 Stat. 170) [Supreme
Court cite is incorrect, actual language appears at STAT. tit. 23, § 1851 (2d ed. 1873)]. This
power included "domestic relations . . . and all other matters which, within the limits of a
State, are regulated by the laws of the State only." 175 U.S. at 168 (citing Cope v. Cope, 137
U.S. 682, 684 (1891)).
15 175 U.S. at 167-68. The Simms Court stated that the federal circuit courts' lack of
jurisdiction over divorce and alimony suits may "be assumed as indubitable ....
But those
considerations have no application to the jurisdiction of the courts of a Territory, or to the
appellate jurisdiction of this court over those courts." Id.
16 The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, however, was limited by a jurisdictional amount requirement of $5000. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 355, 23 Stat. 443 (1883-1885).
The alimony charge met this amount, 175 U.S. at 171, but the divorce claim did not. Id. at
168-69; see note 12 supra.
Oddly, the Simm Court did not address the fact that the Supreme Court was itself an
article III court, even when reviewing a territorial court's alimony award.
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III jurisdiction existed. The Supreme Court's belief in the existence
of the exception was most emphatically illustrated in Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler,' 7 decided three decades after Simms.
In Popovici, a vice-consul challenged the validity of an Ohio divorce decree and alimony award obtained by his wife and affirmed
by the state supreme court. He sought review in the United States
Supreme Court, contending that the state decree was void because
Congress and the Constitution granted the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over suits involving foreign officers.' 8 The Court, in rejecting this argument, held unanimously that nothing in federal law
preempted a state's jurisdiction over divorce and alimony.' 9 Invoking the "common understanding" that such matters were reserved to
the states, Justice Holmes interpreted the congressional and constitutional language to exclude matters which "formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts. '20 Thus, the Supreme Court once
again affirmed the domestic relations exception to article III
jurisdiction.
B.

Child Custody

The Supreme Court significantly expanded Barber-sdomestic relations exception to include child custody in In re Burrus.2 ' In the
Burrus case, a federal district court held a grandfather in contempt
and jailed him for violating its writ of habeas corpus. The writ had
ordered him to return his grandchild to her father. 22 The grandfather then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court for
his own release. He alleged that he was wrongfully detained because
the district court had no jurisdiction to issue its writ. The Supreme
Court agreed. The Court held that the lower court could not issue
the writ unless the child was held in violation of the Constitution or
of federal laws. 23 In language reminiscent of Barber,the Bumrs Court

concluded that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States." 2 4 The Burrus decision, however,
17
18
19
States
20
21
22
23
24

280 U.S. 379 (1930).
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383. Justice Holmes wrote that "the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United
over divorces and alimony always has been denied." Id.
Id at 383-84.
136 U.S. 586 (1890).
Id at 589.
Id at 591-92.
Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
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expressly held open the question of whether a federal court could
determine the right to child custody based on the diverse citizenship
25
of the contestants.
C.

Modem Application of the Domestic Relations Exception

With one possible exception,2 6 the Supreme Court has remained
25 Id. at 596. The early cases did not address whether federal diversity jurisdiction extended to child custody determinations. Although subject matter jurisdiction was asserted on
other bases, jurisdiction was almost uniformly denied over child custody determinations.
Two reasons emerged: the jurisdictional amount requirement was not met, and the matter
was not within federal equity jurisdiction.
Two cases reached the Supreme Court from.the District of Columbia Orphan's Court, in
which parties were seeking to be named guardians over infants. In both cases, the Court held
that the pecuniary value of the guardianship failed to satisfy the required amount in controversy. Ritchie v. Mauro, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 243, 244 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The office of
guardian is of no value, except so far as it affords a compensation for labor and services
thereafter to be earned."); De Krafft v. Barney, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 704, 714 (1862) (no subject
matter jurisdiction where guardianship of child is disputed upon considerations other than
the pecuniary value of that position).
In a case between two parents, the Court held that the custody of a child was a matter
"utterly incapable of being reduced to any pecuniary standard of value." Thus, the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction could not be exercised because the case did not meet the $2,000
minimum amount set by statute. Therefore, the decision of the circuit court below remained
unchallenged. Barry v. Mercien, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847). The lower court had
denied the father's habeas corpus petition to obtain custody of the child from her mother,
asserting that the common law prerogative to act as parens patriae belongs to the sovereign
states and not the federal courts. In re Barry, 42 F. 113, 118-19 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844). The
Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the parens pa/dae power does not belong to the
federal courts in Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1855), discussed at note 64 itnfra.
Two federal courts, however, did entertain child custody suits prior to Burnus. Neither
case was based explicitly on the parties' diversity of citizenship. The question of federal subject matter jurisdiction was not raised in United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I.
1824) (Story, Circuit Justice). In that case, a father had sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
Rhode Island federal circuit court to regain custody of his daughter from her maternal grandparents. Justice Story apparently believed a best interests analysis was appropriate. He
stated that "[wlhen. . . the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into the custody of
the father, . . . it will look into all the circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be for the
real, permanent interests of the infant." Id.at 31. The case was continued until the next day,
when an agreement was reached between the parties. Id. at 32. Thus, no decision was made
on the merits. But see In re Barry, 42 F. 113, 125-26 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844) (suggesting that a
decision on the merits was made in favor of the father).
The best interests approach was applied by a federal territorial court to deny a mother's
habeas corpus petition for the son's release from a missionary school. In re Can-ah-couqua, 29
F. 687 (D. Ala. 1887). Without addressing the basis of its jurisdiction, the court stated that
"when sound morals, the good order and protection of civilized society, unmistakably demand it, the court has no alternative" but to keep the child from the parent. Id. at 690.
26 See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982). In
Lehman, a natural mother sought a federal writ of habeas corpus to regain custody of her
children from a state sponsored foster home after her parental rights were terminated by the
state. Id. at 505-06. Although it did not refer explicitly to the domestic relations exception,
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silent for over fifty years on the subject of the domestic relations exception.2 7 The lower federal courts, however, have considered the
exception in a number of contexts. Some courts have interpreted the
exception narrowly, while other courts have seen it as a broad excep28
tion to federal jurisdiction.
Courts which narrowly construe the exception 29 have entertained family related cases based both in contract, such as suits for
back alimony, 30 and in tort, such as suits arising from parental kidnapping.3 1 Other courts, taking a broader view of the exception,
have refused to hear similar cases. 32 In addition, some courts have
the Lehman Court held that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not exist to consider a
collateral attack on a state court's termination of parental rights.
27 The Supreme Court's last explicit reference to the domestic relations exception was
made by Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, in Ohio ex ret Popovici v. Alger, 280
U.S. 379 (1930).
28 For other general discussions of the subject see Atwood, Domestic Relations in Federal
Court: Toward a PrincipledExercise ofJurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984); Note, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception: A Search for Parameters,31 UCLA L. REV. 843
(1984); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to DiversityJuridiction." A Re-Evaluation, 24 B.C.L.
REV. 661 (1983).
29 See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980) (federal courts lack original
diversity jurisdiction to grant divorce, award alimony, determine child custody, or decree
visitation, but domestic relations exception does not extend to all cases of a domestic relations
nature); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (broad interpretation of
domestic relations, based on expansive reading of Supreme Court dicta, is unwarranted). Accord, Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (diversity suit with intrafamily
aspects should be heard by federal court if essence of suit is in tort or contract and if federal
court need not exceed its competence).
30 See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal court has jurisdiction
to enforce separation agreement between ex-spouses who have lived apart for several years);
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (maintenance and support contract).
31 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (suit against ex-spouse and
her parents for tortious interference with child custody is not barred by domestic relations
exception; resolution of suit does not require special competence of state domestic relations
courts); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (district court has jurisdiction to grant monetary relief to father who is legal custodian of children allegedly abducted
by mother); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1014
(1982) (suit against ex-spouse for generally cognizable torts of child enticement and intentional infliction of emotional distress is within federal court jurisdiction). Cf Fenslage v.
Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1980) (without discussing domestic relations exception, court held that plaintiff in diversity suit may recover damages from ex-spouse and his
relatives for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from wrongful taking of child
from plaintiff's legal custody). Torts other than those arising from a parental kidnapping
have also been litigated in federal court. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980)
(permitting suit against ex-spouse and others for malicious prosecution, arson, conversion,
and conspiracy).
32 See, e.g., Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. 1981) (ex-spouse's counterclaim alleging alienation of child's affection and infliction of mental anguish grew out of
parties' "stormy relationship" and was therefore properly dismissed as within domestic rela-
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used the domestic relations exception to bar suits which seek a decla33
ration of marital or parental status.

Courts have taken a different approach when they address the
question of subject matter jurisdiction within the context of abstention. These courts consider not whether jurisdiction exists, but
whether it should be exercised. 34 Thus, even though the technical
requirements of subject matter jurisdiction may exist, federal courts
may decline to exercise jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.
Reasons for this abstention include the competence and expertise of
state courts in settling family disputes, the strong interests of the state
in domestic relations matters, the risk of inconsistent federal and
state court rulings in cases of continuing state court jurisdiction, and
tions exception); Walker v. Walker, 509 F. Supp. 853, 855 (E.D. Va. 1981) (suit for back
alimony dismissed as within domestic relations exception); Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F. Supp. 97,
100 (D. Md. 1978) (plaintiff's claim that ex-spouse interfered with his communication with
their children falls within domestic relations exception because it relates to child custody and
visitation); Bates v. Bushey, 407 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D. Me. 1976) (domestic relations exception denies federal diversity jurisdiction over "controversies involving virtually all aspects of
domestic relations law"); Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1973) (domestic
relations exception applies to "intrafamily feuds").
33 See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (federal courts have nojurisdiction to establish paternity even though diversity of citizenship and sufficient amount in
controversy exist); Bates v. Bushey, 407 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D. Me. 1976) (paternity action
barred; determination of child's legal status is at core of state's domestic relations jurisdiction
and therefore is beyond jurisdiction of federal courts); Brandscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp.
652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (no federal subject matter jurisdiction over paternity suit, absent
showing that state remedy is unavailable); see also Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir.
1982) (because of domestic relations exception, federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear suit to establish rights in decedent's estate, when recovery hinged on determination of plaintiff's marital status); Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268, 270
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (suit to recover life insurance proceeds barred by domestic relations exception, when plaintiff's relief was "subsidiary to and dependent upon" determination of her
status as decedent's putative spouse). But see Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119, 123-24 (2d
Cir. 1966) (district court may determine who is "wife" for purpose of Social Security benefits);
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935
(1966) (ruling on validity of Mexican divorce for federal income tax purposes); Oxley v.
Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1938) (federal court may decide plaintiff's marital status;
suit's purpose was determining property rights, not marital status).
It has been suggested that, if an action is grounded in contract or tort, a federal court
should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations cases only where a question ofstatus,
as opposed to property, arises. Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the DiversityJurisdictionof
FederalCourts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 1, 31 (1956).
34 The rationale for abstention in the domestic relations area begins with the premise
that neither the Constitution nor federal statutes deny power to federal courts to hear domestic relations cases. Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 89 (D. Md. 1977). See also Zimmerman
v. Zimmerman, 395 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (tradition of domestic relations exception reflects deference to federalist system, not question of inherent power).
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congested federal dockets.a5
Abstention has been based on various doctrines recognized by
the Supreme Court, as well as on more general principles of comity
and federalism. The results of these approaches have been far from
uniform. 36 In fact, whether the jurisdiction of federal courts over do35 Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp.
88, 90 (D. Md. 1977). See also notes 85-115 infra and accompanying text.
36 A number of federal courts have held that abstention is appropriate in cases that
"verge" on the domestic relations exception, although not falling precisely within the exception. See Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1981) (abstention
appropriate in suit against trustee, in which plaintiff's alleged property rights are based on exspouse's support obligation under divorce decree); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475 (2d
Cir. 1976) (abstention proper in ex-spouse's suit to modify divorce decree, where full reliefwas
available from state court having expertise and familiarity with matrimonial disputes that
federal courts lack); Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir. 1975) (dismissal of exspouse's action to set aside seizure of his property, seized for non-support, by state-appointed
receiver was proper because circuit court's policy is "to keep our federal hands off actions
which verge on the matrimonial, or impinge upon the matrimonial jurisdiction of the state
courts"); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974) (comity and common
sense dictate abstaining from ex-husband's suit to enjoin ex-wife's foreclosure on mortgage
made pursuant to divorce decree); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosentiel, 490
F.2d 509, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1973) (district court should have stayed action by law firm to recover from husband for legal services rendered to wife in matrimonial dispute).
In addition, federal courts have refused to hear civil rights suits that involve domestic
relations. See Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981) (district court properly abstained from suit that, although clothed in garb of state civil rights action, amounted to demand for child's custody); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972)
(abstention proper in federal civil rights action brought by children alleging unconstitutional
deprivation of their right to counsel in parents' custody dispute).
For other examples of federal court abstention in domestic relations cases, see Huynh Thi
Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978) (for reasons of comity and deference to state
court expertise, district court should not have asserted jurisdiction over aliens' habeas corpus
action, seeking custody of their children, while state remedies had not been exhausted); Zaubi
v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 836 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (abstention proper in action by children
claiming constitutional right to stay in U.S. with father, contrary to custody decree, where
children had opportunity to raise claim in state custody proceedings and where rendering
decision would disrupt establishment of coherent state policy); Brenhouse v. Bloch, 418 F.
Supp. 412, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court abstains in action by ex-spouse for breach of separation
agreement, because court should not become involved in question of child custody and visitation rights).
Other courts, however, have refused to abstain, asserting jurisdiction over cases in the
domestic relations area. See Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 553 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982) (abstention inappropriate in action to enforce divorce decree when
suit primarily involves interpretation of federal bankruptcy laws); Crouch v. Crouch, 566
F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court properly exercised jurisdiction over case for
breach of separation agreement, where case involved "little more than a private contract to
pay money between persons long since divorced"); Korby v. Erickson, 550 F. Supp. 136, 13839 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (abstention inappropriate in suit between unmarried couple for breach of
contract to share ownership of home).
In a related area, federal courts have abstained from hearing parents' constitutional challenges to state procedures Tor protecting victims of child abuse. See Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S.
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mestic relations matters is addressed in terms of power or abstention,
a clear standard for determining when a case should be heard has
failed to emerge.
II.

Legal Authority for the Domestic Relations Exception

A variety of reasons for the domestic relations exception have
been advanced. One theory relied on by the Supreme Court to support the absence of power to hear domestic relations suits is the lack
of diversity jurisdiction. It has been asserted that not only is diversity
of citizenship lacking between a wife and husband, but a divorce
cannot be reduced to a pecuniary value and it therefore fails to meet
any jurisdictional amount requirement. It also has been argued that
the article III jurisdiction of federal courts was never intended historically to encompass divorce, alimony, and child custody. Finally,
federal courts have intimated that domestic relations matters are beyond their power because they are reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment.
A.

Absence of Diversit Jurisdiction

The position that federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction over
divorce and alimony suits was originally based on two premises: the
domicile of a wife followed that of her husband, and a divorce action
could not be reduced to a monetary value. At English common law,
a wife could not establish a legally recognized domicile separate from
her husband's as long as the marriage continued.3 7 This general rule
was followed by American courts, 38 thereby preventing spouses from
establishing diversity of citizenship. 39 An exception, however, was
recognized in this country: if a wife left her husband for cause or he
abandoned her, then she was permitted to establish a separate domi415 (1979) (federal court should abstain where temporary removal of child in abuse context is
closely related to criminal statutes, parents could have raised constitutional claims in pending
state proceedings, state showed no bad faith, and statute was not patently unconstitutional).
For termination of parental rights, see Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1976)
(principles of comity bar federal suit challenging state decree terminating plaintiff's parental
rights without notice to him); see also notes 85-115 infta and accompanying text.
37 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43.
38

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 (1971); Ander-

son v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891) (husband's domicile is wife's domicile, even if she is

living apart from him without cause); Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849, 849 (N.D. Ill. 1887)
(wife's citizenship is that of her husband).
39 For purposes of federal jurisdiction, the test for state citizenship is a person's domicile.
Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123 (1886); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF FEDERAL COURTS § 26, at 146 (4th ed. 1983).
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cile for the limited purpose of suing him for divorce or maintenance. 40 Apparently, the wife retained the husband's domicile for
41
other purposes.
In Barber v. Barber,42 the divided Supreme Court implicitly
equated a wife's limited separate domicile with diverse citizenship.
The strong dissenting opinion, however, asserted that a married woman could not "become a citizen of any State or community different
from that of which her husband is a member. '43 A woman apparently was able to establish citizenship diverse from that of her husband, at least for the purpose of suing for divorce or alimony, after
acquiring a judicial separation in a state court. Constitutional and
statutory guarantees have now bestowed legal personhood upon married women in the United States, and make it clear that spouses may
be legal citizens of different states.4 Nevertheless, some later cases
continued to follow the general rule that marriage confers upon a
45
wife the citizenship of her husband.
A stronger argument for lack of diversity jurisdiction is that the
statutory amount in controversy requirement is not met in domestic
relations cases. 46 Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
40 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § "125,at 115
(6th ed. 1881) (wife who has acquired a judicial separation or divorce from bed and board, or
who needs own domicile to sue for divorce, may acquire separate domicile to establish jurisdiction for divorce suit); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 595 (1859) (if husband
abandons wife, "he yields up that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil hers"). But see Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 601-02 (1859) (Daniels, J., dissenting) (a married woman, even though legally separated from her husband, cannot be a citizen
of a state different from him).
41 See, e.g., 2 BISHOP, supra note 40, § 125, at 116 ("It would not be necessary to regard
the wife's separate domicil complete for every purpose; but it is a quasidomicil, for the special
purpose of divorce.'); Id § 126, at 116 (if wife commits offense causing husband to sue her for
divorce, she does not have separate domicile).
42 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859); see notes 3-11 supra and accompanying text.
43 Id at 602 (Daniels, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
44 The issue of a wife's separate domicile was addressed in Spindel v. Spindel, where the
court asserted that "[w]hatever the ancient doctrine, a wife is capable of acquiring a domicile
separate from that of her husband; at least to the extent legal equality of the sexes is embodied in the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments." 283 F. Supp. 797, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
The Supreme Court approached this position several years earlier, recognizing a wife's separate domicile for the purpose of suing her husband's mistress in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
45 Campbell v. Oliva, 295 F. Supp. 616, 618 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Seideman v. Hamilton,
173 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1959), af'd,275 F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820
(1960). But see Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (fourteeth and
nineteenth amendments allow wife to acquire separate domicile); Druen v. Druen, 247 F.
Supp. 754, 755 (D. Colo. 1965) ("citizenship of husband and wife are no longer necessarily
identical').
46 The amount in controversy requirement has been increased several times since its in-
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held that divorce, 47 marital status, 48 and child custody 49 are matters
that cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard. Back alimony
claims, however, may satisfy the requirement. 50 The rationale that
value cannot be placed on such relationships, however, is weakened
by the fact that wrongful death actions have placed a monetary
value on the company of a child. 5 1 Furthermore, because monetary
claims are such an integral part of any contested divorce action, it is
unlikely that such an action could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 52 Significantly, that requirement is a purely statutory limitation, and so avoids an examination of the constitutional
basis for the domestic relations exception.
B.

Article III Courts Were Not Established to Hear Divorce, Alimony,
and Child Custody Cases

American courts have recognized that the equity jurisdiction of
the federal courts is the same as that of the English chancery courts
at the time of the Revolution.5 3 At that time, in England, divorce
ception in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Diversity cases now require an amount in excess of
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Federal question cases have not required any amount in
controversy since 1980. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
47 De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S.
162, 168-69 (1899).
48 Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1969); Walpert v. Walpert, 329 F.
Supp. 25, 26 (D.N.J. 1971).
49 De Krafft v. Barney, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 704, 714 (1863); Barry v. Mercien, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 103, 120 (1847); Ritchie v. Mauro, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 243, 244 (1829); Hernstadt v.
Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967).
50 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
51 See, e.g., Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) (mother entitled to damages for
loss of son's love, companionship, protection, and affection caused by defendant's negligence);
Ahrenholz v. Hennepin County, 295 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1980) ("The parents may be
compensated for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection which they could reasonably have expected if the child had lived."); Caradori v. Fitch, 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649
(1978) (parents and siblings allowed recovery for loss of security, comfort, and companionship
of the child).
52 This suggestion appears in the seminal article on the domestic relations exception,
Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdictionof Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 28 (1956).
53 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 529 (1932); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank
Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909); Jackson v. United States Nat'l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.
Or. 1957); Albanese v. Richter, 67 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.J. 1946), a 'd, 161 F.2d 688 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947); Loring v. Marsh, 15 F. Cas. 905, 914 (C.C.D. Mass.
1865) (No. 8,515), af'd, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 337 (1867); Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 447
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764).
The original language of the Judiciary Act extended jurisdiction to "all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. With
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1948, this language was changed
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and alimony were within the exclusive province of the ecclesiastical
courts. 54 Chancery courts were not authorized to grant initial di-

vorce or alimony decrees until 1858, 55 although they did enforce ecclesiastical decrees before that time. 5 Chancery courts also
determined marital status when it was incidental to the matters being tried, 57 and entertained suits against trustees for the maintenance
of women whose husbands were beyond the jurisdiction of the eccle58
siastical courts.
American courts have held that matters formerly dealt with by
the ecclesiastical courts belong to the states rather than to the federal
government. 59 Federal courts, however, like their English chancery
counterparts, have acknowledged the distinction between granting
and enforcing divorce and alimony decrees. 60 In addition, federal
courts have ruled on marital status questions arising in property
61
disputes.
As with divorce and alimony, the federal courts have stated that
to "all civil actions." Act ofJune 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 930 § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. No substantive
change in federal jurisdiction was intended; the language of the statute was merely brought
into conformity with Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)
(Reviser's note).
54

1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621-24 (3d ed. 1922).

55 The ecclesiastical courts were stripped of most of their jurisdiction by a statute creating in the chancery division a new Divorce Court, which was given jurisdiction over divorce,
anullment, alimony, and other marital matters. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21
Vict., ch. 85.
56 Set, e.g., Dawson v. Dawson, 32 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1803) (alimony arrearages are enforceable as equitable debt); Shaftoe v. Shaftoe, 32 Eng. Rep. 70 (Ch. 1802); Mildmay v.
Mildmay, 23 Eng. Rep. 305 (Ch. 1682) (chancery will enforce ecclesiastical alimony decrees);
Read v. Read, 22 Eng. Rep. 720 (Ch. 1668) (chancery may prevent husband from leaving
country to avoid compliance with ecclesiastical alimony decree).
57 SHELFORD, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 260 (1841); see cases cited in Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 807-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
58 See Watkyns v. Watkyns, 26 Eng. Rep. 460, 461 (Ch. 1740) (interest from trust to be
paid to wife while husband remains out of country); Colmer v. Colmer, 25 Eng. Rep. 310,304
(Ch. 1729) (wife entitled to maintenance from husband's estate held in trust to pay his debts);
Nicholls v. Danvers, 23 Eng. Rep. 1037 (Ch. 1711) (trust income of husband, who forced wife
to leave him, to be used for wife's maintenance); see also cases and authorities cited in Spindel
v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 808-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
59 See, e.g., Ohio ex rtel. Popovici v. Alger, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) (Federal courts do
not have jurisdiction over matters that "formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical
Courts."). Id. at 384.
60 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590-91 (1859).
61 See Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1966) (federal income tax);
Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1938) (property rights). But see Csibi v. Fustos,
670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to hear suit that necessitated determination of
plaintiff's marital status to establish property rights in decedent's estate); Welker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268, 270 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (same; life insurance proceeds).
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only state courts can determine child custody issues. 62 This principle
also derives from English chancery practice. In addition to its equity
jurisdiction, the English chancery court exercised the prerogatives of
the crown. The most notable of these was the parenspatriaedoctrine,
where the court decided what was best for a child by substituting its
own judgment for that of the parents. 63 It has been argued that the
nonjudicial prerogatives of the crown, such as the parenspairiaedoctrine, devolved upon the sovereign states and not upon the federal
government. 64 The federal courts thus assumed only that jurisdiction
which the chancery court had exercised "in its judicial character as a
62 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103,
120 (1847).
63 Literally "parent of the country," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979), the
parenspatriaedoctrine derived from the King's royal prerogative as guardian to infants, lunatics, and others with legal disabilities. See also SCHOULER, supra note 5, § 288, at 463 ("[T]he
jurisdiction exercised by the court of chancery over infants flows from its general authority, as
delegated by the crown. . . .[T]he State must place somewhere a superintending power over
those who cannot take care of themselves; and hence chancery necessarily acts representing
the sovereign as parens patriae."). See generally Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of ParensPatriae,
27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
64 Prior to Barber,a federal court stated that the writ of habeas corpus "is purely one of
prerogative." In re Barry, 42 F. 113, 118 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844), appeal dism;ssedfor lack ofjurisdiction sub nom. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847). The sovereign, in regard to
children, acts as parenspatriae"upon the assumption that its parentage supersedes all authority conferred by birth on the natural parents, tak[ing] upon itself the power and right to
dispose of the custody of children as it shall judge best for their welfare." Id. at 119. Because
all of the attributes of sovereignty do not "devolve upon the national government," there is
"no sure foundation for the assumption that the federal government possesses common-law
prerogatives, inherent in the sovereign, which can be exercised without authority of positive
law." Id at 119.
In Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854), the Supreme Court distinguished
the judicial from the prerogative authority of the English chancery court. In denying the
federal jurisdiction of a probate matter, the Court stated that "when this country achieved its
independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States ...
The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae." Id. at 384. The chancellor's powers to act
"merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king's prerogative as parens
patriae,are not possessed by the circuit courts." Id.at 384. Chief Justice Taney, in a separate
opinion, agreed:
These words [U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2] obviously confer judicial power, and
nothing more; and cannot on any fair construction, be held to embrace the prerogative powers, which the king, as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the
courts. And the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, as granted
by the constitution, extends only to cases over which the court of chancery had
jurisdiction, in its judicial character as a court of equity. The wide discretionary
power which the chancellor of England exercises over infants . . . has not been
conferred.
These prerogative powers. . . remain with the States.
Id. at 393 (Taney, C.J., concurring). But see Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1033 (3d
Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Taney's opinion).
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'65

court of equity.
The historic evidence seems to support a very narrow domestic
relations exception, limited to suits for divorce, alimony, or child custody.66 Critics have asserted, however, that history does not support
a domestic relations exception because English chancery courts did
hear domestic relations cases before the federal court system was established. 67 Yet, this position cannot be supported. The cases cited
are generally either historic anomalies or those that would not fall
within a narrow jurisdictional exception. 68 In general, English chancery courts only assisted the ecclesiastical courts in enforcing and
supporting ecclesiastical decrees. Similarly, federal courts have
given, and should continue to give, assistance to the state courts in
enforcing and supporting similar state decrees.
C.

Domestic Relations Matters Are Reserved to the States under
the Tenth Amendment

The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
65 Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854) (Taney, C.J., concurring).
66 But see, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (domestic relations exception is "collection of misstatements of ancient holdings
and of ill-considered dicta").
67 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, The Domestic
Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1824, 1835 (1983).
68 During Cromwell's interregnum in the mid-seventeenth century, the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts was temporarily suspended. Chancery, therefore, was the only avenue of
relief for plaintiffs who would have brought ecclesiastical suits. As a result, chancery courts
granted alimony decrees during this time. See, e.g., Whorwood v. Whorwood, 21 Eng. Rep.
556 (Ch. 1662-1663) (affirming alimony decree granted by chancery court "in the late
Times"); Russel v. Bodvil, 21 Eng. Rep. 545 (Ch. 1660-1661).
The English case of Terrell v. Terrell, 21 Eng. Rep. 123 (Ch. 1581), has been cited as
proof that the chancery courts granted divorces. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, supra, note 67, at 1836 n.81. That case, in its entirety, is reported
as follows: "and in the same roll, two decrees for divorce. Terrell and his wife, Jeffery and
Jenny." 21 Eng. Rep. 123. The original reporter is described as "virtually little else than a
rough index, never intended to be published." 21 Eng. Rep. 5. (prefatory note dated 1902).
Thus, it is hardly persuasive authority for the critics' position.
Chancery decrees granting spousal support did so not by issuing alimony decrees, but by
exercising the chancery's equitable powers to reform a trust. The suits generally were
brought against trustees by women whose husbands were beyond the reach of the ecclesiastical court. Set, e.g., Watkyns v. Watkyns, 26 Eng. Rep. 460 (Ch. 1740) (decreeing husband's
trust income to wife until his return to the kingdom); Colmer v. Colmer, 25 Eng. Rep. 301
(Ch. 1729) (decreeing abandoned wife's maintenance to be paid out of husband's personal
estate, held in trust to pay his debts).
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or to the people. '69 The Supreme Court has never expressly held
that the federal judiciary is limited by the tenth amendment. It did
so implicitly, however, in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.7 0 Erie examined
whether federal courts are bound to apply state court decisions in
diversity suits. The Court held that the federal courts had unconstitutionally usurped state power by establishing a federal general common law. 7 Although the Court did not name a specific
constitutional provision, it implicitly invoked the tenth amendment.
The Court drew upon an earlier opinion which stated that the
tenth amendment forbids the federal courts from creating a "general
law of the country" because the Constitution "recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States-independence
in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. '72 Further, the Erie Court's reasoning paralleled the tenth
amendment when it held that a continued, unfettered establishment
of federal general common law "invaded rights which . . . are re-

served by the Constitution to the several States. ' 73 As other cases
have interpreted the tenth amendment as a limit on the federal legislature, Eie stands for the proposition that the tenth amendment also
74
limits the federal judiciary.
69

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71 Id at 80; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 55, at 352-59.
72 304 U.S. at 78-79 (quoting from Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)). Justice Field also asserted that "[t]he silence of Congress
against judicial encroachments upon the authority of the States cannot be held to estop them
from asserting the sovereign rights reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution." 149 U.S. at 399 (Field, J., dissenting).
73 304 U.S. at 80. Referring to this language from Erie, Professor Wright states that
"[p]resumably the reference is to the Tenth Amendment," although no reference is made to
any specific constitutional provision. C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 56, at 360.
74 Judge Friendly and Professor Tribe seem to agree that the federal judiciary is limited
outside of the limits mentioned in article III of the Constitution. Judge Friendly perceives the
tenth amendment as the outer bound, while Professor Tribe sees federalism acting as the
ultimate restraint on federal judicial power. In response to critics who suggest that the constitutional underpinnings of Erie are dictum, Judge Friendly posits that Congress would not
have the power, for example, to enact a federal statute granting tort immunity to charities.
Continuing, Judge Friendly states that "[ilt would be even more unreasonable to suppose that
the federal courts have a law-making power which the federal legislature does not. Power to
deal with the hypothesized subject and others like it is thus reserved by the Tenth Amendment 'to the States respectively, or to the people."' Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-Andof the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 395 (1964).
Professor Tribe does not specifically refer to the tenth amendment when he states that
the Supreme Court's decision in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874),
is stronger support than Erie for the position that the Constitution outside of article III limits
federal judicial power, even though a federal court may have jurisdiction over a particular
case pursuant to a valid congressional act. In Murdock, the Court held that it lacked appellate
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This tenth amendment rationale, however, has limitations. The
amendment can be interpreted to support one of two theories. The
first, a state enclave theory, suggests that some areas of the law belong affirmatively to the states. Under this theory, the federal government lacks power to take away from the states any matters within
the enclave. 75 The second theory, that the tenth amendment is but a
truism, 76 suggests that the tenth amendment merely reflects the rela-

tionship between federal and state powers. This relationship is premised upon the federal government's power to control virtually all
areas of law, with those areas not chosen to be federally regulated left
to the states.,
Since the Supreme Court's decision in NationalLeague of Cities v.
User, 77 the state enclave theory has gained validity. 78 The Court,
jurisdiction to review a federal question decided by a state court, even erroneously, if the state
court's decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 301-02 nn.8 & 10 (1978).
According to Professor Tribe, prior to Erie, federal courts imposed their opinions of what
the state law was without regard to the manner in which state courts would derive the common law. Beyond being unconstitutional, this practice took federal courts beyond their grant
of authority in the diversity statute. Id. § 3-31, at 119. Professor Tribe continues his analysis:
[E]ven if Congress could reach as far in its legislation as federal courts had reached
in making common law, the judge-made law would nonetheless be unconstitutional
in the absence of congressional authorization if it were made outside the confines of
the diversity grant. This conclusion . . . follows . . . from the prevailing political

theory of federalism.
Id. § 3-31, at 119 n.24.
75

See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL

POWER 126-27 (1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-20, at 302; Barber, NationalLeague of Cities
v. User7. New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 165-66 (1979).
76 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Today the view that the tenth amendment is but a truism has support from such scholars
as Barber, supra note 75, at 172, and Ely, The IrrepressibleMh of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693,
701-702 (1974), and was reinforced by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
266 (1983); see note 79 infra and accompanying text.
77 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
78 In NationalLeague of Cities, the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which set forth minimum wage and maximum hour provisions for state
and municipal employees. The Court held that the amendment to the act violated Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause because it interfered with the state's ability to function
effectively and intruded upon traditional functions of state government. Id. at 851-52. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that the tenth amendment "expressly declares
the constitutional policy" that the power of Congress is limited vis-A-vis state sovereignty. Id.
at 842-43.
Justice Rehnquist's reference to the tenth amendment has been given different meanings.
Lower federal courts have interpreted National League of Cities as a restriction by the tenth
amendment on the federal commerce power. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1083 (5th Cir. 1979); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D.
Ga. 1982).
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist's reference to the tenth amendment has also been inter-
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however, retreated significantly from the enclave theory in EEOC v.
Wom'ng, 79 so the meaning of the amendment is, at best, still a
mystery.8 0
Yet, regardless of its interpretation, the tenth amendment supports a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Divorce,
alimony, and child custody would surely fall within a state enclave, if
one exists. A state enclave of reserved powers that does not include
these matters is difficult to imagine, given their judicial history in
England and their analogous treatment in the United States.
Alternatively, if the tenth amendment merely states a truism, it
nonetheless embodies the basic concepts of comity and federalism
that support federal judicial restraint in the domestic relations context.8 1 Although the concepts of comity and federalism are conceppreted as merely an expression of a limitation on Congress, without indicating the limitation's
origin. Powell, The CompleatJefrsonian."Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317,
1329 (1982); Tribe, UnravelingNationalLeague of Cities: The New Federalism andAffinmative Rights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067 n. 17 (1977). As suggested by one
scholar, Justice Rehnquist's hesitancy to link "his state sovereignty doctrine too closely to the
Tenth Amendment . . . [leaves] the doctrine floating in mid-air, without a visible constitutional foundation other than his theory of federalism." Powell, supra at 1329.
79 460 U.S. 226 (1983). In upholding an amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to include state and local governments within the definition of "employer," the Court attempted to clarify its holding in National League of Cities. Qualifying its
allusion to the tenth amendment in National League of Cities, the Court all but rejected an
enclave theory, reducing the amendment to a mere expression of federal-state relations:
The principle of immunity articulated in NationalLeague of Cities is a functional doctrine,. . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a federal system in which the States
enjoy a 'separate and independent existence,' .
not be lost through undue federal
interference in certain core state functions.
Id. at 236.
80 The meaning of the tenth amendment may be clarified in the present term of the
Supreme Court. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983),
(probable jurisdiction noted), the Supreme Court asked the parties to reargue "[w]hether or
not the principles set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), should
be reconsidered?" 104 S. Ct. at 3582. For a summary of the arguments made by the parties,
see 53 U.S.L.W. 3255 (1984).
81 The Burger Court, especially Justice Rehnquist, seems adamant about separating the
meaning of the tenth amendment and the roles of comity and federalism vis-a-vis their limitations on federal power. See Powell, supra note 78, at 1329. This position is evidenced by the
Court's ostensible reliance on the tenth amendment to limit Congress in National League of
Cities and its rapid retreat from that decision seven years later in EEOCv. Wyoming. It is also
illustrated by such decisions as Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Fair Assessment in
Real Estae Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); see also note 80 supra. In Younger, the Court
sanctioned abstention in limited circumstances based on the concepts of "Our Federalism."
In A'a ~ny, the Court dismissed a § 1983 action brought by certain taxpayers to challenge a
state's taxing scheme on federalism grounds. The Court did not articulate whether the dismissal was based on an absence of power (potentially invoking the tenth amendment), or
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tually distinct, they are often used interchangeably or in tandem.
Comity is the belief that state courts can protect and enforce federal
rights as capably as federal courts.8 2 In contrast, federalism requires
the federal government "to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests

. .

in ways that will not unduly interfere with the

legitimate activities of the states.18 3 Both concepts derive from the
basic structure of the Constitution in establishing a dual
84
sovereignty.
abstention (in keeping with principles of comity and federalism). See note 84 in/a and accompanying text.
Efforts to keep the meaning of the tenth amendment a mystery, however, fail to recognize the origins of comity and federalism. See notes 82-84 in/ta and accompanying text. Although the Constitution does not affirmatively express that comity and federalism act to limit
federal power, this proposition follows from the theory that the Constitution was structured to
accommodate a dual government, i.e., a national government comprised of states that retain
their identity and autonomy to function as states. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 298-300 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-20, at 301.
At a minimum then, as Justice Rehnquist intimated in NationalLeague of Cities, the tenth
amendment expresses a historical intent about the appropriate structure of the national and
state governments. Under that structure, the state governments were meant to function separately and independently, but within the framework of a national government that was to be
supreme. The legislative and judicial branches of the national government cannot act in
ways to alter this basic structure. For general discussions that the tenth amendment reflects
this structural view of the Constitution, see Nagel, Federalism as a FundamentalValue. National
League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT.REv. 81; Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 723 (1983).
82 The Supreme Court, 1974 Tenn, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 151 n.2 (1975).
83 Id. Professor McGowan stated that:
Federalism means many things to many people. In its broadest common meaning,
however, it refers to the relations between the states and the general government
under our political system. These relations have involved a dual aspect. First, federalism has meant the desirability and necessity of the general government deferring
to the states in order to allow them their proper role over issues of state and local
concern. But the other side of federalism is the desirability and necessity of the state
governments' deferring to the general government in issues of national concern.
McGowan, Federalism-Oldand New--and the Federal Courts, 70 GO.L.J. 1421, 1431 (1982).
84 See L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-20, at 301 and authorities cited therein.
The Burger Court, and especially Justice Rehnquist, is noted for relying on comity and
federalism as a basis for judicial restraint. See Tribe, supra note 78, at 1069 and cases cited
therein; Powell, supra note 78. For examples of cases relying on comity and federalism see
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 106, 109 (1981) (section 1983
action brought by certain taxpayers to challenge state's administration of its tax system dismissed on, inter alia, comity and federalism grounds); World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (due process, "acting as an instrument of interstate federalism," may restrict jurisdictional reach of state court).
Most notable among the Court's "federalism" opinions is its decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from which the term "Our Federalism" was coined. See note 91 infra.
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Applying the Abstention Doctrine to Domestic
Relations Cases
A.

DistinguishingPower and Abstention

When litigants bring a domestic relations case in federal court
under its federal question jurisdiction, or appeal from a state court to
the Supreme Court for review of a federal question, federal judicial
power exists, unless otherwise limited by Congress. Federal courts
hear many domestic relations cases that raise constitutional questions
in the context of divorce, alimony, and child custody. Because of the
explicit grant of federal question jurisdiction in article III, and because of the Supreme Court's role as the ultimate guardian of federal
constitutional rights, domestic relations cases that raise federal questions should be treated like other federal question cases. 85 Any other
approach would be inconsistent with the supremacy clause and our
system of dual sovereignty. Additionally, a different approach could
create friction and confusion in the area of domestic relations law
among the states and between the federal and state judiciaries.
Originally, the reason for a federal interest in hearing diversity
suits was to provide a neutral forum for out-of-state litigants who
otherwise were forced to sue in state courts that favored citizen parties. 86 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Erie, which generally
obviated the problem of state court bias against noncitizen litigants,
much debate has focused on whether there is any federal interest in
retaining diversity jurisdiction. 8 7 As long as the diversity statute is
not repealed, however, federal courts must follow the congressional
directive and hear diversity suits.88
85 Treating domestic relations cases which raise federal questions like other federal question cases includes the possibility of applying Pullman abstention. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
86 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 23, at 128.
87 Congress has attempted to abolish diversity jurisdiction on a number of occasions. See,
e.g., H.R. 3689, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). The American Law Institute proposed an
amendment to the diversity statute that would have excepted, inter alia, domestic relations
cases from diversity jurisdiction in federal courts. After years of debate, the entire matter was
dropped for failure to reach an agreement on the issue of what other areas ought to be specifically excepted from the statute. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1330 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968).
For authorities on both sides of the debate, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 23.
88 Federal courts, in fact, have a duty to hear diversity suits. This principle was originally announced in dicta in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), where the
Court stated that:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitu-
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Both federal question and diversity suits occasionally present
circumstances where the federal interests in adjudicating them are
outweighed by competing interests that favor abstention. The
Supreme Court has sanctioned abstention when: (1) a state court
decision might obviate the need to decide a federal question (Pullman
abstention); (2) the area of activity at issue is intimately regulated by
a state (Burford abstention); or (3) a state court proceeding is pending
(Younger abstention). Different principles support each of these abstention doctrines.
Pullman abstention is founded on the principle that federal
courts should avoid answering federal questions in cases where a decision under state law would settle the dispute. 89 Underlying Burford
abstention is the principle that federal courts should refrain from interfering with highly regulated and supervised state activities to
avoid rendering decisions which might conflict with state court decisions or otherwise contradict state policy. 9° Finally, Younger abstention is appropriate when a state court proceeding is pending while a
related federal action has not yet reached the merits. 9' Such an abstention is based on principles of comity and federalism.
tion ... [w]ith whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended,
we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Id. at 404. Today the rule has been relaxed by the adoption of various doctrines, perhaps the
most important and pervasive of which is abstention. But even the Court has recognized that
there is a line beyond which federal courts arguably abrogate their constitutional responsibility when they abstain from cases properly before them. Se, e.g., Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943) (federal courts cannot abdicate their duty to hear a diversity suit
merely because state law is difficult or unclear); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668,
674 n.6 (1963) (federal courts have no basis to abstain in cases properly brought in federal
court merely because they could be heard in state court); see also Currie, The FederalCourts and
the American Law Institute (Part II), 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 268, 317-19 (1969) (advocating that
abstention be abolished).
89 Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). At issue in Pullman
was whether the Railroad Commission had denied Pullman's constitutional rights in rendering a certain administrative order and whether, in fact, the Railroad Commission had authority under state law to render it. The Supreme Court ordered the lower federal court to
abstain from deciding the case. The Court's rationale was that a constitutional question
would be avoided if the Railroad Commission lacked authority under state law.
90 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burfordinvolved a challenge to a permit
to drill for oil issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas. The Court held that abstention
was appropriate in order to avoid interference with the state's scheme for administering its oil
industry. Application of this doctrine is limited generally to situations involving state regulation of commerce or natural resources. See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
91 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the district court was asked to
enjoin state officials from prosecuting Harris for distributing leaflets in violation of state laws.
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Lower Federal Court Practice of Abstaining

Some federal courts have abstained in domestic relations cases
without reference to any of the sanctioned doctrines. Other federal
courts in similar cases have abstained, relying expressly on Burfordor
Younger. In either situation, the practice of abstaining in domestic
relations cases is troublesome. First, express reliance on Burford or
Younger is often improper. Second, federal courts abstain in many
cases merely because they touch upon family law or because the litigants are related, and not because the principles underlying the abstention doctrines necessarily warrant judicial restraint.
Although many domestic relations suits have characteristics in
common with Burfordand Younger, neither abstention doctrine strictly
applies to them. Generally, three characteristics earmark cases in
which Burford abstention might be appropriate. First, the regulated
activity in most cases is unique; generally it involves a natural resource9 2 or concerns a regulated commercial activity. 93 Second, as a
The Supreme Court held that federalism prevented federal courts from enjoining pending
state criminal actions.
Younger abstention has been extended to prevent federal injunction of state civil actions
as well. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
92 Burfordinvolved the regulation of oil. See note 90 supra. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968), the Court found abstention appropriate in a condemnation proceeding involving water rights. Although no state agency regulated the activity, as in
the typical Burford-type case, the concurring Justices saw Kaiser as a Burford abstention case.
391 U.S. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also C. WRIGHT, supranote 39, § 52, at 308 n.
30; see also Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (abstention upheld in eminent domain proceeding). Some commentators have suggested that
Thibodaux is a separate abstention doctrine in light of the Court's decision in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), decided the same day. See, e.g., C.
WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 52, at 308-09; M. REDISH, supra note 75, at 240-43; Field, Abstention
in Constitutional Cases.- The Scope of the Pullman Doctrtze, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1148-53
(1974); Shapiro, Abstention andPrimayJurisdiction: Two Chips offthe Same Block?-A Comparative
Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 75, 77, 97 (1974).
Allegheny, like Thibodaux, involved an eminent domain proceeding, but the Court held
that abstention was inappropriate. Commentators have struggled to distinguish the two decisions. Their general concensus is that abstention is appropriate in eminent domain proceedings if the case also involves an unclear question of state law. C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 52,
at 308-311. M. REDISH, supra note 75, at 242; Field, supra at 1150.
The Supreme Court, however, treated Thibodaux and Burford as standing for one type of
abstention in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81415 (1976). At issue in Colorado River were the rights of the United States and certain Indian
tribes under Colorado's laws governing the regulation of water. Although the Court noted
that Colorado River did not fall into any of its sanctioned doctrines, id. at 817, it recognized that
some of the principles underlying other areas in which it had authorized abstention did apply. Id at 818-19. Commentators and lower federal courts have viewed Colorado River as a
qualification on Burford. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 52, at 311 n.39.
93 Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951) (Bur-
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result of this unique quality, a state will have promulgated sophisticated rules governing the regulation of the activity and will have established agencies to apply such rules in accordance with state
action is usually propolicy. Finally, judicial review of an agency's
94
court.
state
particular
one
in
vided for
Strong state policies also underlie the laws governing family relationships. Moreover, many states have established family courts or
special "family law" departments within their judicial systems. 9 5
Unlike the regulated activities in Burford-type cases, however, domestic relations suits do not involve the regulation of natural resources or
commercial activity. Nor have states established administrative
agencies to supervise the regulation of family life. 96 In short, domestic relations is not a highly regulated area where a federal decision is
97
likely to impinge on state policy and create a federal-state conflict.
Burford abstention, therefore, does not apply. Nevertheless, federal
courts have invoked this doctrine in a variety of domestic relations
cases. 98
fordabstention appropriate in federal action challenging constitutionality of state's regulation
of certain railroad services); Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law ofFederal Courts, 60 N.C.L.
REV. 59, 77 (1981); Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation ofjudicialPower, 27
VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1125 (1974).
94 The Supreme Court views state judicial review of a state administrative order as an
integral step in the overall administrative procedure. Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-27; see also
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951) (Burfordabstention upheld in action challenging state administrative order where petitioner had not sought
review of the agency's order in state court. The Supreme Court held that the state court was
"an integral part of the regulatory process.").
95 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1730-1772 (West 1982) (laws establishing and governing "family conciliation courts" to handle disputes relating generally to divorce and child
custody); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901-973 (1974) (laws establishing and governing "family
law courts" to handle matters relating generally to the welfare of minors).
96 The threshold for state intervention into family life was stated in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977), where the Court, noting that family life was a protected
liberty where judicial deference to the legislature was inappropriate, stated: "This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
97 Some federal courts have refused to apply Burford abstention to domestic relations
cases outside of the domestic relations exception. The courts reason that the cases require no
special expertise and federal adjudication does not run the risk of interfering with state policy
or rendering conflicting decrees. See Kelser v. Anne Arundel Co. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 679 F.2d
1092, 1094 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Colorado Rive); Korby v. Erickson, 550 F. Supp. 136, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 811 (E.D.N.Y 1968).
98 Se, e.g., Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061, 1062 (4th Cir. 1977) (Burfordabstention appropriate to avoid interference with state policy in action by mother seeking to attach father's salary
under federal statute in fulfillment of his child support obligations when child support had
not been adjudicated in state court); Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 834 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(abstention appropriate under Colorado River to avoid interference with state policy in action
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The potential for a federal-state conflict also arises when similar
federal and state court proceedings are pending concurrently. The
Younger abstention doctrine holds that a federal court should abstain
from hearing a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief regarding a
state's action when the state is seeking to enforce its laws or policy
against the federal plaintiff. For example, Younger abstention has
been applied to domestic relations cases concerning child abuse enforcement, 99 involuntary termination of parental rights, 0 0 and enforcement of child support payments' 0 ' in which parents have
attempted unsuccessfully to have the state proceedings halted by the
federal court. Outside of these limited areas, however, Younger abstention is not relevant. Yet, the doctrine has been cited in other
0 2
domestic relations contexts where its use is unjustified.'
Federal courts also have abstained in domestic relations cases
that do not fall within the Pullman, Burford, or Younger doctrines. For
example, abstention has been invoked by courts in cases brought to
enforce divorce or voluntary separation agreements, and in suits
challenging the constitutionality of state custody laws.' 0 3 The various rationales used by federal courts to support their decisions to abstain include such reasons as: (1) a strong state interest 0 4 and a
concomitant weak federal interest in domestic relations,' 0 5 (2) the
greater resources available to state courts, 0 6 (3) the ability of state
courts to provide adequate remedies, 0 7 (4) interference with state
by children of divorced parents seeking to enjoin their return to Norway with their mother
who had custody of them pursuant to decrees in Denmark and Pennsylvania); Bell v. Bell,
411 F. Supp. 716, 718 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (Burfordabstention appropriate in deference to state
interest in domestic relations in action challenging the constitutionality of state divorce law).
99 Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 447-52
(N.D. Tex. 1979).
100 Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 633 (6th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Williams, 532
F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1976); DeWyse v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 952, 956 (W.D. Mich. 1982);
Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 447-52 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
101 Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980).
102 See, e.g., Merrick v. Merrick, 441 F. Supp. 143, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (extension of
Younger questionable in action brought by father of illegitimate child challenging the constitutionality of state statute that presumed mother should have custody).
103 See note 36 supra and sources cited therein.
104 Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Jagiella v.
Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir. 1981); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d
Cir. 1972).
105 Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043. Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d at
1215; Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d at 787.
106 Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489,492 (7th Cir. 1982); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d
348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974).
107 Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475-76 (2d Cir. 1976).
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court proceedings, 10 8 (5) the expertise of state courts in domestic relations, 10 9 (6) comity,"10 (7) the need to avoid inconsistent judgments, 1 1 (8) the congestion of federal dockets, 112 and (9) the desire to
avoid involvement in cases that would require continuing federal
court supervision. 1 3
This general practice of abstaining in domestic relations cases is
an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's broad disclaimer of federal jurisdiction over family matters. Although the rationales relied upon
by federal courts in support of their decisions seem meritorious, abstention has become a convenient means for federal courts to avoid
addressing the question of federal jurisdiction in close cases. Considering the duty imposed on federal courts by the Constitution and
Congress to provide a forum for federal question and diversity suits,
federal courts should not be able to abdicate their responsibility by a
loose reliance on abstention. Such reliance is particularly inappropriate when the Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts
should not abstain in cases merely because they raise family law issues or involve related parties. 114 Federal courts, however, continue
to confuse the concepts of jurisdictional power and federal policy in
domestic relations cases.
Nevertheless, a situation unique to domestic relations in which
abstention is proper, even though Pullman, Burford, and Younger do not
apply, arises when a federal court is asked to decide a matter within
the domestic relations exception, as well as a closely related issue for
which federal jurisdiction clearly exists. Although the court may
have power under its ancillary or pendent jurisdiction to entertain
the entire suit, comity and federalism compel abstention.' 1 5
108 Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d at 1217.
109 Id. at 1215; Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d at 564; Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d at
632; Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d at 475; Phillips, Nizer Benjamin, Krim and Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d at 516; Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d at 373.
110 Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d at 632; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d at 350.
111 Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 492; Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d at 564; Sutter v. Pitts,
639 F.2d 842, 844 (lst Cir. 1981).
112 Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d at 564; Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980);
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d at 350.
113 Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
114 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379-380 n.5 (1978) (in action challenging constitutionality of state law limiting right to marry of men with outstanding child support payments,
Court rejected argument that abstention was appropriate "out of 'regard for the independence of state government in carrying out their domestic policy.' ").
115 See notes 132-34 infra and accompanying text.
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IV. Jurisdictional Guidelines
A general framework can be established for analyzing when a
federal court should invoke the domestic relations exception. Such a
framework can apply to cases involving issues within the exception
and also issues outside of the exception.
A.

Establszhing Guidelines

When a domestic relations case is brought in federal district
court, the court should go through the following analysis: (1) Does
jurisdiction exist? (2) If jurisdiction exists, do any sanctioned abstention doctrines warrant judicial restraint? (3) If not, should the court
nevertheless abstain under principles of comity and federalism?
In attempting to answer these questions, it is helpful to categorize a suit as either a domestic relations exception (DRE) case, a nondomestic relations exception (non-DRE) case, or a hybrid case. If a
party seeks only an original or modified divorce decree, alimony
award, child custody determination, or a combination of these, the
suit is a DRE case. If a party seeks none of these, the suit is a nonDRE case. If a party seeks some type of relief within the domestic
relations exception and additional relief, the suit is a hybrid case.
The answer to the first question, whether jurisdiction exists, is
straightforward in DRE and non-DRE cases. Assuming that the
technical requirements of diversity or federal question jurisdiction
are met, the district court lacks power to hear the DRE cases and has
power to hear the non-DRE cases. Less clear is whether the court has
jurisdiction over a hybrid case. If the DRE and non-DRE issues arise
out of a common nucleus of operative fact and could be expected to
be brought in one action, the court has power to extend its ancillary
or pendent jurisdiction to the DRE issues.1 6 Alternatively, the hybrid case could be divided into its DRE and non-DRE components.
The two could then be treated like a DRE and a non-DRE case,
116 Ancillary and pendent jurisdiction follow judge-made, discretionary rules that allow
federal courts to hear issues that ordinarily are beyond their jurisdiction due to a lack of
either a federal question or complete diversity of citizenship. A claim is said to be pendent to
the main claim when it "derive[s] from a common nucleus of operative fact" and, "assuming
substantiality of the federal issue," the party bringing the claim "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966). Although the question in Gibbs was one of pendent jurisdiction, the same
standard was applied to ancillary jurisdiction in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 370 (1978). Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are, nonetheless, technically distinguishable. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 19, at 103 n.1.
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respectively. The DRE case would then be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction and the non-DRE case would be heard.
Once jurisdiction is established over the non-DRE or the hybrid
case, the court should address the second question in the analysis: Is
abstention appropriate to all or part of the case? The court should
initially focus on whether the approved abstention doctrines of Pullman, Burford, or Younger apply., 1 7 In non-DRE cases, if the abstention
doctrine of Pullman, Burford, or Younger applies, the court should refrain from hearing the case. If Pullman, Burford, or Younger warrants
abstention on the non-DRE part of a hybrid case, the court should
also dismiss the DRE portion of the case even if ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction would otherwise support jurisdiction. As a matter of
comity and federalism, the court should not exercise its discretion to
extend jurisdiction in such situations.
The third step in the analysis arises in a hybrid case where the
Pullman, Burford, or Younger abstention doctrines do not apply to the
non-DRE issues of the case. If the DRE portion of the case fails to
meet ancillary or pendent jurisdiction requirements, the court should
dismiss only that portion of the hybrid case; it should retain jurisdiction over the non-DRE portion of the case. This result will be rare,
however, because of the broad standard governing ancillary aid pendent jurisdiction.t s
Even in hybrid cases satisfying the requirements of pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction, the principles of comity and federalism weigh
heavily against federal adjudication of the DRE issues. Respect for
the states' traditional role in deciding these matters calls for judicial
restraint. Thus, the appropriate response in a hybrid case should be
to sever the claims and entertain only the non-DRE issues, or to abstain from the entire case if the DRE and non-DRE components derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and could be expected
to be heard in only one action.
117 Specifically, if a decision by a state court on state law grounds would obviate the need
to decide a federal question, the district court should abstain under Pullman. If the action
involves a state agency's administrative scheme, and raises the possibility that a federal decision would interfere with the establishment of a coherent state policy, Burford abstention
would be appropriate. Younger abstention would apply in the very limited situation where a
party seeks to enjoin a concurrent state proceeding to which the state, its officer or agent is a
party. See notes 85-115 supra and accompanying text.
118 See note 116 supra.
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App'ying the Guidelines

In three recent cases, Wasserman v. Wasserman, 1 9 Bennett v. Benand Lloyd v. Loepffr,12 1 federal district courts heard actions for
the tort of child-snatching. The facts followed a similar pattern:

nett,120

Parents (P1 and P2) of child (C) sued for custody of C in state X.
State X decreed that P1 was to have custody of C, with P2 to
retain visitation rights. P1 and C continued to reside in state X;
P2 took up residence in state Y P2 removed C to state Y and
refused to return C upon P1's request. P1 sued P2 in district
court on the basis of diversity, seeking damages in excess of
$10,000 for emotional harm, child enticement, or a similar tort.
At the commencement of the suit, if Chad not been returned, P1
also sought injunctive relief for C's return.
The jurisdictional question was addressed at the trial level in
Wasserman122 and was raised sua sponte by the appellate courts in Bennell1 23 and Lloyd' 2 4 All three appellate courts held that P1's action
for damages arising from the child-snatching was within federal jurisdiction. 2 -5 Additionally, the Bennett and Lloyd courts found that P1's
request for equitable relief fell within the domestic relations exception. 126 The courts reasoned that to decide the equitable relief question was to determine child custody. 27 The question whether the
119 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982).
120 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
122 671 F.2d at 833-34. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis of the domestic relations exception.
123 682 F.2d at 1041-42. The suit was dismissed at the trial level apparently on other
grounds.
124 694 F.2d at 491-92. At the district court level, the plaintiff was awarded actual damages, as well as punitive damages to accrue on a daily basis until the child was returned.
125 Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 493-94; Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042; Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 834-35.
126 Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 493-94; Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042-44. The Lloydcourt found accelerating punitive damages to be similar to the injunctive relief sought in Bennett. 694 F.2d at
494. Notwithstanding its conclusion that the request for accelerating damages fell within the
domestic relations exception, the Lloydcourt did not vacate the district court's award since it
was not contested on appeal. Id at 494. Of course, if the court lacked jurisdiction to grant
punitive damages, it was correct to raise that issue on its own. The court, however, also
should have dismissed the case on that basis. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.'.
127 The Bennett court was incorrect in holding that the district court lacked power to issue
injunctive relief for the return of the child. Similarly, the Lloydcourt erred by suggesting that
the district court lacked power to grant punitive damages due to their similarity to an injunction for the child's return. See notes 128-29 infa and accompanying text. Lloyd, however, like
Wrasserman, reached a correct result.
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district court should have abstained was not addressed expressly by
any of the courts.
Applying the jurisdictional guidelines established above 128 to
the fact pattern, P1's entire suit should be heard by the district court.
First, P1's suit is within the court's jurisdiction since it is a non-DRE
case. P1 is not seeking a divorce, alimony award, or child custody
determination. P1's request for injunctive relief for the return of Cis
merely a request to have the court enforce a prior valid state decree.
Second, none of the abstention doctrines apply.129 Finally, the third
analysis question, whether the court should abstain on the basis of
comity or federalism, arises only in the hybrid case and so is
inapplicable.
A modification of the fact pattern illustrates how the jurisdictional guidelines apply to a hybrid case between private parties.
Suppose that P2 counterclaims against P1, seeking a modification of
state X's custody decree. The court's power over P1's claim is unaltered. P2's counterclaim satisfies ancillary jurisdiction requirements
because the claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact
and could be expected to be tried in one action.' 30 The court, in its
discretion, may extend subject matter jurisdiction to the counterclaim. Under the same standard that satisfies ancillary jurisdiction,
the counterclaim is compulsory. It must be joined with the plaintiff's
3t
claim or the claim will be permanently denied a federal forum.'
The court must first decide whether to extend jurisdiction to
P2's counterclaim. As in the original fact pattern, the abstention
doctrines in Pullman, Burford,and Younger do not apply. Principles of
comity and federalism, however, support abstention. First, a federal
court determination of C's custody would evidence a lack of respect
for the "institutional autonomy" of the state judicial system.'

32

The

independence of the states to regulate domestic relations, especially
child custody, has been recognized for over a century. 3 3 Additionally, an exercise of federal jurisdiction would unduly interfere with
the state's continuing jurisdiction over C's custody, a matter of
purely local concern. Federal courts, historically deferential to the
128 See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
129 For a discussion of the various abstention doctrines see notes 85-115 supra and accompanying text.
130 See note 116 supra.
131 FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
132 L. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 3-39, at 147.
133 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); see
notes 1, 21 supra and accompanying text.
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states in the area of family law, also lack familiarity and experience
with certain aspects of family law. Consequently, the chances are
greater that a federal court would resolve a child custody dispute
differently than the state court that would otherwise decide the question. Finally, the federal court's interest in adjudicating the case,
merely because diversity jurisdiction exists, is outweighed by a competing interest in federalism and a desire to avoid a conflict with the
state.
After deciding not to extend jurisdiction over the counterclaim,
even though the requirements of ancillary jurisdiction are met, the
court must then decide whether to entertain the remainder of the
case. Given the close relationsip between P1's claim and P2's compulsory counterclaim, the court should abstain from P1's claim as
well. Judicial economy and fairness to the parties militate against
134
hearing only part of the case.
V. Conclusion
Federal courts should continue to honor a narrowly defined domestic relations exception. Historically, granting divorces, awarding
alimony, and determining child custody were beyond the jurisdiction
of article III courts and were reserved to the states in their sovereign
capacity. In the interests of comity and federalism, the allocation of
power between federal and state courts over such matters should not
be altered.
Domestic relations cases that raise issues outside of the exception
may be within the realm of federal jurisdiction. Unless abstention
principles sanctioned by the Supreme Court warrant judicial restraint, federal courts have a responsibility to entertain those cases.
Finally, federal courts should analyze domestic relations cases
containing divorce, alimony, or child custody issues ancillary to other
issues to determine whether the cases can be split accordingly. Federal courts should dismiss the divorce, alimony, or child custody issues, if they are severable from the remainder of the case. If not, then
the entire case should be dismissed. Comity and federalism support
dismissing the divorce, alimony, or child custody issues; fairness and
efficiency support abstaining from the remainder of the case.
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United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

